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I. 
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
All parties to this proceeding are listed in the 
caption of this case. 
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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
This case does not present questions requiring review 
on writ of certiorari. 
OPINION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is reported at 
Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau. Inc. et al.. 185 Utah Adv. 
Rptr. 16 (Utah C. App. 1992). A copy of the opinion is attached 
as Exhibit A. 
GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT IS INVOKED 
The Court of Appeals opinion was filed April 22, 1992. 
Jurisdiction is asserted by the appellees pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-2-2 and Rules 45-51 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
CONTROLLING LAW 
The controlling provision of law is Rule 50 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure regarding motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the jury's verdict. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Mr. Turner filed a worker's compensation claim 
which was adjusted by General Adjustment Bureau (GAB). GAB 
became suspicious about the validity of the claim and retained 
the service of Inteldex to investigate it. (Tr. 133, 215, 233-
234). 
2. Mrs. Turner was involved in the claim from the 
outset. She filled out the original claim form for her husband 
(Tr. 305), and regularly communicated with the GAB adjusters 
regarding the claim. (Tr. 235, 259, 291, 306). 
3. Mrs. Turner admitted at trial that she had told GAB 
things which were not true regarding her husband's condition. 
(Tr. 291-292). 
4. Inteldex's investigation involved six occasions on 
which the Turners were contacted. All these contacts were 
handled by Ron Hyer of Inteldex. (Tr. 131). There were five 
visits at the Turner home ranging in length from 17 minutes to 34 
minutes. There was also one telephone conference. The total 
time involved for all the contacts was 2 hours and 8 minutes. 
(Trial Exhibits 2 and 3). 
5. Mr. Hyer did not introduce himself as a private 
investigator. His object was to obtain candid information. He 
used the cover of a door to door market testing representative. 
He gave the Turners various free products. (Tr. 166). Mr. Hyer 
was friendly and courteous. He never came into the home 
uninvited. (Tr. 161, 166, 265, 303). 
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6. Inteldex is an investigation company that provides 
services to insurance companies and Federal and State agencies 
for investigation of questionable compensation or liability 
claims, as well as theft and embezzlement. (Tr. 114, 101, 115, 
119). 
7. Inteldex representatives appeared at Mr. Turner's 
worker's compensation hearing and testified regarding what they 
had seen. Mrs. Turner specifically conceded that the Inteldex 
testimony was honest and truthful. (Tr. 294, 304). 
8. Mr. Turner was denied further benefits. 
Subsequently, he and Mrs. Turner filed this action against 
Inteldex and GAB. Several claims were alleged which were 
dismissed by the court prior to trial. Those remaining for trial 
were Mrs. Turner's claim of fraud, invasion of privacy, and 
conspiracy. (Tr. 894, 896). 
9. At trial, she claimed for a loss of $20 in 
babysitting expenses and an indeterminate loss of wages, but the 
evidence she presented was unconvincing and not accepted by the 
jury. 
10. She also claimed generalized emotional distress 
damages. Her only support of such damage claim was her own 
testimony and that of her husband. She did not present any 
professional psychiatric testimony although at the time of the 
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trial, she was undergoing psychiatric treatment for a number of 
other problems she had which she stated were unrelated to 
Inteldex and GAB. 
11. The jury found unanimously that plaintiff had 
failed to prove either fraud or invasion of privacy. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLEE'S PETITION ATTEMPTS TO ARTICULATE THREE 
BASES FOR CERTIORARI. NONE OF THE ISSUES SUGGESTED 
MERIT SUCH CONSIDERATION. 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IS CONSISTENT 
WITH ESTABLISHED CASE LAW. 
In inflammatory language, appellee suggests that the 
ruling of the Court of Appeals somehow runs counter to Anglo 
Saxon Tradition. However, she fails to specify any such 
conflict. 
Plaintiff's Complaint sought relief under the theories 
of invasion of privacy and fraud. It is apparently plaintiff's 
argument that any time an individual enters a home without 
revealing their purpose, it is an invasion of privacy per se. 
This argument is inconsistent with the law of invasion of 
privacy. 
The court's instruction to the jury regarding invasion 
of privacy was based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
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Section 652B and Comment D. Appellee took no exception to it. 
The instruction read as follows: 
In this case, the plaintiff Jackie Turner 
claims that the defendants have invaded her 
privacy. In order to find that defendants 
have invaded the plaintiff's privacy, you 
must find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that: 
1. The defendants intentionally intruded 
upon the solitude or seclusion of the 
plaintiff or her private affairs or 
concerns; aitd 
2. That the intrusion was substantial and 
would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person. 
Any intrusion must be judged on its own facts. The 
issues of reasonableness and degree of offensiveness are issues 
of fact within the special province of the jury. Cruz v. 
Montova. 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983). By her motion for JNOV and 
this petition for writ of certiorari, appellee seeks to bypass 
the jury's wisdom and establish a per se rule. 
Most of the cases cited by appellee involve either 
trespass claims criminal and fourth amendment search and seizure 
issues which are inapplicable. None of the cases that she cites 
which involve civil invasion of privacy claims offer any support 
for a per se rule. 
For example, in the case of Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. 
Rptr. 668 (1987), a television news crew barged into plaintiff's 
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home and filmed her husband as he was dying of a heart attack in 
his bedroom. Neither plaintiff nor her husband had given the 
news crew any permission to come in. Graphic scenes were taken 
of his distress which were broadcast nationally. The California 
Appellate Court reversed a summary judgment of dismissal of 
plaintiff's claim for invasion of privacy. It determined the 
conduct of entering the home without invitation and subsequent 
broadcast could be considered by a jury to be "highly offensive 
to a reasonable person." It reversed summary judgment so that a 
jury could decide. 
The Miller court did not determine as a matter of law 
that the right of privacy had been violated per se. It simply 
determined that there was a jury issue. The invasion in that 
case was clearly far more severe than the invasion in the instant 
case. Nevertheless, even in that circumstance, the court did not 
grant judgment in favor of plaintiff as a matter of law as is 
requested here. 
The case of Hester v. Barnett. 723 S.W.2d 544 (Missouri 
App. 1987) also cited by plaintiff involves the same result. The 
Hester case involved a situation in which the plaintiffs had 
engaged in private confidential discussions with their minister 
regarding family problems. The minister publicly revealed what 
they had told him in confidence and branded them as child 
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abusers. Plaintiffs sued the minister for invasion of privacy. 
The Missouri Appellate Court reversed a summary judgment of 
dismissal and remanded the case for jury determination. 
As with the Miller case, the Hester case involves 
conduct dramatically more egregious than that in the instant 
case. Nevertheless, the court required a jury to determine 
whether the conduct violated the right of privacy, it did not 
substitute its own opinion. 
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case is 
consistent with a long legal tradition. Issues of reasonableness 
and offensiveness are issues uniquely suited to jury 
determination. In this case, the jury found that appellee had 
failed to carry her burden of proof. The verdict was supported 
by competent evidence. The verdict should not have been 
disturbed. The Court of Appeals correctly reinstated it. 
POINT II 
APPELLEE'S ATTEMPT TO EXPAND THE LAW OF FRAUD 
DOES NOT MERIT CERTIORARI. 
In addition to her invasion of privacy claim at trial, 
plaintiff also attempted to prove fraud. However her efforts to 
demonstrate any pecuniary loss were not persuasive and were 
rejected by the jury. The Court of Appeals correctly found that 
there was competent evidence to support that finding. Appellee 
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argues that she should be able to recover "emotional distress" 
damages under her fraud claim even in the absence of any 
pecuniary damage. 
The trial court and the Court of Appeals were 
consistent in rejecting this expansion of the law of fraud. 
While appellee was able to point to certain cases from other 
jurisdictions which allowed emotional distress damages in fraud 
cases under particular facts or circumstances, the bulk of case 
law and the commentators are consistent in restricting fraud to 
claims of pecuniary harm. Dobbs Handbook on Legal Remedies, 
§ 9.2 at 602 (1973). This position is also consistent with 
Section 525 and 549 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
This rule is further consistent with Section 46 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts which provides for a separate tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress and defines the 
elements of that tort. Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1982). Plaintiff's attempt to utilize the elements of fraud to 
i 
support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and thus circumvent the requirements of Section 46 of the 
Restatement is inappropriate and contradictory. Both lower 
courts properly rejected it. 
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POINT III 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS 
CONSISTENT WITH LONGSTANDING UTAH LAW. 
In a final attempt to create some justification for 
certiorari, appellee claims that the Court of Appeals erred in 
determining the standard of review to be applied in this case. 
Appellee's position is simply wrong. 
Recent cases from this court defining the standard to 
be applied in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a JNOV motion 
define it as follows: 
A trial court should grant a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict if, 
after reviewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the non-movant, it finds 
that no competent evidence supports the 
verdict. In reviewing the trial court's 
determination on such an issue, this court 
must apply the same standard. 
King v. Fereday. 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987) at p. 620. 
The granting of a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is only justified 
if, after looking at the evidence and all its 
reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to the party moved against, the 
trial court concludes that there is no 
competent evidence which would support a 
verdict in his favor. On review, this court 
looks at the evidence in the same manner. 
Gustaveson v. Greg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982) at p. 695. 
In other words, the trial court can enter the 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict only for 
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one reason—the absence of any substantial 
evidence to support the verdict. 
Koer v. Mavfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) at p. 568. 
In fact, the very case upon which appellee relies to 
claim some conflict in standards further supports the rule. 
The court's standard of review of a directed 
verdict is the same as that imposed upon the 
trial court. We must examine the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the losing party, 
and if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom that would support a judgment in 
favor of the losing party, the directed 
verdict cannot be sustained. 
Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc.. 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982) at p. 898. 
The standard of review utilized by the Court of Appeals in this 
case could not have stronger support. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee's purported grounds in their Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari are meritless and without basis. The writ should 
be denied. 
DATED this day of v/.^ **yy- , 1992. 
RICHARDS/BRAtfDT, MILfcER & NELSON 
STEVE! 
for Appellants 
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E x h i b i t "A" 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
APR 2 21092 
^w^MiA— 
Mafirr.Neonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court ol Appeals 
Jackie Turner, 
Plaintiff, Appellee, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
General Adjustment Bureau, 
Inc.; Oak Norton; and Inteldex 
Corporation, d/b/a Inteltech 
Services, 
Defendants, Appellants, 
and Cross-Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 910587-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 2 2 , 1992) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorneys: Craig L. Barlow, Salt Lake City, for General 
Adjustment Bureau 
Robert L. Stevens and Michael L. Schwab, Salt Lake 
City, for Oak Norton and Inteldex 
Gordon K. Jensen, West Valley City, and Glen A. Cook, 
Salt Lake City, for Jackie Turner 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Russon. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendants, General Adjustment Bureau (GAB), Inteldex 
Corporation, d/b/a Inteltech (Inteltech), and Oak Norton (Norton) 
appeal the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
(j.n.o.v.) in favor of plaintiff, Jackie Turner (Turner), and the 
punitive damages award. Turner cross appeals, asserting that the 
trial court erred (1) by refusing to instruct the jury that 
emotional distress damages are recoverable in a cause of action 
for fraud, (2) by admitting evidence concerning Turner's past 
drug use and psychological history, and (3) by refusing, after 
granting j.n.o.v., to submit the issue of damages to the jury. 
We reverse. 
FACTS 
On November 30, 1984, Turner's husband filed a workers' 
compensation claim asserting that he was injured in a work-
related accident. His employer's workers' compensation insurance 
carrier, Occidental Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, retained 
GAB to adjust the claim. GAB, in turn, hired Inteltech to 
investigate the claim. 
Inteltech employees, masquerading as representatives of a 
product marketing research company, conducted an undercover 
investigation of the claim over a period of approximately three 
months. Utilizing the marketing company facade, they gained 
access to the Turner home to gather information about the 
activities of Turner's husband. Inteltech employees visited the 
Turners at their home and asked them to test various consumer 
products on a continuing basis. In addition to testing products, 
an Inteltech employee invited Turner to participate in a shopping 
spree. However, on the day the shopping spree was scheduled to 
occur, Inteltech cancelled it. Turner claims that as a result of 
the invitation, she lost approximately twenty dollars because she 
had hired and paid a babysitter. 
Turner further claims that as a result of her unwitting 
participation in the undercover investigation, she lost time she 
could have spent working. Turner's work consisted of tasks 
performed for her landlord on a by-the-job basis, for which she 
received rent credits. 
On July 20, 1987, at a hearing on the workers' compensation 
claim of Turner's husband, Inteltech employees appeared and 
testified about information gathered through the undercover 
investigation. It was then that Turner first became aware that 
Inteltech employees had represented themselves as market 
researchers for the purpose of investigating her husband's claim. 
After the hearing, the administrative law judge denied the 
workers' compensation claim. 
Turner sued, claiming fraud, invasion of privacy, and 
conspiracy. She sought special, general, and punitive damages. 
The case was tried to a jury on March 12 through 14, 1990. 
At the close of Turner's case, defendants moved for a 
directed verdict, whicji the court denied* Turner, in turn, moved 
for a directed verdict at the close of defendants' cases, which 
the court took under advisement. The issues of fraud, invasion 
of privacy, conspiracy, and Norton's personal liability were 
submitted to the jury. The jury rendered a verdict against 
Turner on both the fraud and invasion of privacy claims, and 
therefore, did not reach the conspiracy claim and damages issues. 
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Thereafter,- Turner moved for j.n.o.v. and for a new trial on all 
issues submitted to the jury. 
After oral argument, the trial court granted j.n.o.v. and 
denied the motion for a new trial. The court ruled that "no 
reasonable minds could have differed on the evidence which was 
presented to [the jury] . . . . And it was highly offensive to 
this Court for the defendants to do what they did to [Turner].11 
As to the claim of fraud, the court found that Turner proved 
damages in the amount of twenty dollars for the babysitter. The 
court, however, found that Turner's evidence concerning damages 
for lost work time was "too speculative." 
The court entered judgment, jointly and severally, against 
GAB and Inteltech on the fraud, invasion of privacy, and 
conspiracy claims in the following amounts: $20.00 for out-of-
pocket damages; $5,000.00 for general damages; $3,000.00 for 
punitive damages; post-judgment interest; and attorney fees. The 
trial court further found Norton to be personally liable for the 
entire amount of the judgment. Turner moved to amend the 
judgment to allow the damages issues to go to the jury. The 
court denied the motion. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the losing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 
P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). In other words, j.n.o.v. "is only 
justified if, after looking at the evidence and all of its 
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the party 
moved against, the trial court concludes that there is no 
competent evidence which would support a verdict in his favor." 
Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1982); King v. 
Feredav. 739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987). On appeal, we apply the 
same standard. Gustaveson. 655 P.2d at 695; King. 739 P.2d at 
620. In determining whether competent evidence supports the 
verdict, we accept as true all testimony and reasonable 
inferences flowing therefrom that tend to prove defendants' case, 
and we disregard all conflicts and evidence that tend to disprove 
defendants' case. Koer v. Mavfair Mkts.. 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 
P.2d 566, 568-69 (1967). 
FRAUD 
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in granting 
j.n.o.v. because competent evidence supported the jury's verdict 
of no fraud in that Turner was not damaged as a result of the 
undercover investigation. 
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To establish fraud, a party must prove by clear and 
convincing .evidence each of the following elements: (1) a 
representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
material factr (3) which was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that 
there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a 
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party 
to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) 
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to that party's injury and 
damage.1 Mikkelson v. Quail Vallev Realty. 641 P.2d 124, 126 
(Utah 1982); Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247 P.2d 273, 
274-75 (1952). 
The trial court in the instant case applied the wrong 
standard in granting j.n.o.v. Instead of determining whether 
competent evidence supported the verdict, see, e.g.. King v. 
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987), the court found that no 
reasonable minds could have differed on the evidence presented. 
Viewing the evidence in favor of defendants, we conclude 
that substantial competent evidence supported the jury's verdict 
of no cause of action for fraud. Turner's evidence that she 
sustained damage when she hired and paid a babysitter apparently 
was not, as viewed by the jury, clear and convincing. At trial, 
when asked how much she paid the babysitter, Turner vaguely and 
equivocally testified, "I think it was like twenty bucks or 
1. GAB contends that Turner must prove substantial damage to 
recover under her claim of fraud. In support, GAB cites to 
Dilworth v. Lauritzen. 18 Utah 2d 386, 424 P.2d 136, 138 (1967), 
where the Utah Supreme Court, after stating that "one of the 
essential elements of fraud is that the plaintiff sustain 
damages," cites to Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247 
P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952), and section 105 of the third edition of 
Prosser on Torts (currently located at section 110 of the fifth 
edition of Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts). Although < 
section 110 of Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts supports 
the proposition that substantial damage is required before a 
fraud or deceit cause of action can arise, see W. Page Keeton et 
aJL. , Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 110, at 765 & n.l 
(5th ed. 1984), GAB reads Dilworth too broadly. Utah law 
requires that a party sustain only some injury or damage. See i 
Mikkelson v. Quail Vallev Realty. 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982); 
Dugan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980); Taylor v. Gasor, 
Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1980); Rummell v. Bailey. 7 Utah 2d 
137, 320 P.2d 653, 659 (1958); Pace. 247 P.2d at 274-75. 
Moreover, this court has interpreted Pace to require that a 
complaining party need only "establish some damage." Conder v. < 
A.L. Williams & Assocs.. 739 P.2d 634, 640 (Utah App. 1987). 910587-CA 4
something like that . . . . It was reasonable." Furthermore, 
Turner did not identify the babysitter nor did she produce 
evidence of payment as claimed. 
Finally, competent evidence supported the jury's implied 
finding that Turner did not sustain any lost work time damages. 
Consistent with the jury's finding, the court found this claim to 
be "too speculative" inasmuch as it was based solely on Turner's 
unsubstantiated assertions of lost work time. Because the jury 
had competent evidence to support its verdict that no fraud 
occurred,2 the trial court erred in granting j.n.o.v. on the 
claim of fraud.3 
INVASION OF PRIVACY 
Defendants claim that competent evidence supported the 
jury's verdict that there was no invasion of Turner's privacy. 
Invasion of privacy as a common law tort has developed into four 
2. The failure to prove any of the previously mentioned elements 
of fraud is fatal to a complaining party's case. Inasmuch as 
competent evidence supports the jury's implied finding of no 
damage, we need not address arguments concerning other elements 
of fraud. 
3. Assuming, arguendo, Turner could prove some sort of damage 
under her fraud claim, as a complaining party, she still had a 
duty to mitigate damages. Conder, 739 P.2d at 639. A 
complaining party is not entitled to recover damages resulting 
from wrongful conduct which could have been avoided or minimized 
by reasonable means. Anaelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 
671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983); Conder. 739 P.2d at 639. 
Defendants' evidence demonstrates that Turner failed to 
mitigate the damages she claims to have sustained by having to 
hire and pay a babysitter. Turner testified that an Inteltech 
investigator called and cancelled the shopping spree the day it 
was scheduled. Other than the bald statement that the babysitter 
still had to be paid, Turner gave no explanation why she could 
not cancel the babysitter or otherwise minimize her damages. 
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distinct torts/ However, Turner's cause of action is based only 
on the tort of-.intrusion upon seclusion. 
To establish an invasion of privacy claim of intrusion upon 
seclusion,5 a complaining party must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence an intentional substantial intrusion, physically or 
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of the complaining 
party that would be highly offensive to the reasonable person.6 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B & cmt. d (1977); accord W. 
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts. 
§ 117, at 855 (5th ed. 1984). The language "highly offensive to 
the reasonable person" suggests a determination of fact for which 
a jury is uniquely qualified. See Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723, 
4. In the classic article entitled Privacy. Prosser enumerated 
the four torts under the right to privacy as follows: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or 
solitude, or into his private affairs; 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts 
about the plaintiff; 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false 
light in the public eye; and 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of 
the plaintiff's name or likeness. 
William L. Prosser, Privacy. 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960); Cox 
v. Hatch. 761 P.2d 556, 563 n.7 (Utah 1988). 
5. There is little case law to assist us in the determination we 
make today concerning Turner's invasion of privacy claim. The 
most probable reason for this is because 
even today most individuals not acting in some 
clearly identified official capacity do not go 
into private homes without the consent of those 
living there; not only do widely held notions of 
decency preclude it, but most individuals 
understand that to do so is either a tort, a 
crime, or both. 
Miller v. National Broadcasting Co.. 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678-79 
(Ct. App. 1986) (footnotes omitted). 
6. Once a party establishes a cause of action for invasion of 
privacy, that party recovers for mental distress damages proved, 
if such damages are the kind that normally result from such an 
invasion. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H(b) (1977); see 
also Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co.. 291 P.2d 194, 
198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) ("the fact that damages resulting from 
an invasion of the right of privacy cannot be measured by a 
pecuniary standard is not a bar to recovery"). 
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729 (Utah 1983). In determining issues of fact,7 a jury 
necessarily accepts the testimony of certain witnesses and 
discounts conflicting testimony. Fillmore Prods, v. Western 
States Paving, 592 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1979). On appeal, we will 
not substitute our judgment for that of the jury unless no 
competent evidence supports the verdict. Id. 
After viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
flowing therefrom in a light most favorable to defendants, see 
Koer v. Mavfair Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566, 568-69 
(1967), we conclude that competent evidence supported the jury's 
verdict of no invasion of privacy. The record discloses first, 
that the purpose and scope of the undercover investigation was 
limited to gathering information concerning the workers' 
compensation claim.8 Second, at no time did Inteltech 
representatives enter Turner's home without her permission. 
Third, the investigation visits were relatively short. Fourth, 
Turner's credibility was called into question by competent 
evidence. Based on the foregoing, the jury could reasonably 
conclude, as it apparently did, that Inteltech employees did not 
substantially intrude in a manner that would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person. Therefore, the trial court erred by 
granting j.n.o.v. on the invasion of privacy claim. 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES FOR FRAUD 
Turner cross appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by 
refusing to instruct the jury that emotional distress damages may 
be recovered in a fraud action. A challenge to a trial court's 
refusal to give a jury instruction presents questions of law. 
Ramon By and Through Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 
1989). Consequently, we do not defer to the trial court's 
rulings. Id. We affirm such a refusal when the proposed 
instruction does not properly and fairly state the law as applied 
to the facts of the case. Xc|. at 133-34. 
Whether emotional distress damages are recoverable for fraud 
is a question of first impression under Utah law. Authorities 
are split on this issue. Illustrative of decisions not allowing 
recovery of emotional distress damages in a fraud action are 
7. The jury has broad prerogatives in determining issues of 
fact. Evans v. Stuart. 17 Utah 2d 308, 410 P.2d 999, 1002 
(1966). 
8. There is no evidence in the record and no claims were made at 
trial that Inteltech employees harassed or annoyed Turner in the 
course of the undercover investigation. 
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Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 382 (Iowa 1987); Carrigg v. 
Blue. 323 S.E.-2d 787, 789 n.l (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Umphrev v. 
Sprinkel. 682 P.2d 1247, 1258-59 (Idaho 1983); Ellis v. Crockett. 
451 P.2d 814, 820 (Haw. 1969); and Harsche v. Czvz. 61 N.W.2d 
265, 272 (Neb. 1953). In contrast, Kilduff v. Adams. Inc., 593 
A.2d 478, 484 (Conn. 1991); Trimble v. Citv of Denver, 697 P.2d 
716, 730 (Colo. 1985); Crowley v. Global Realty. Inc., 474 A.2d 
1056, 1058 (N.H. 1984); McRae v. Bolstad. 646 P.2d 771, 775-76 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd. 676 P.2d 496 (Wash. 1984); and 
Rosener v. Sears. Roebuck & Co.. 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 246 (1980), 
appeal dismissed. 450 U.S. 1051, 101 S. Ct. 1772 (1981) 
illustrate decisions allowing such recovery. 
As indicated above, many jurisdictions follow the rule that 
emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a cause of 
action for fraud. £f. First Sec. Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. 
Feedvards, Inc.. 653 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982) (emotional 
distress damages "are an extreme remedy, which should be 
dispensed with caution"). This rule stems from the principle 
that fraud, as an economic tort, protects only pecuniary losses. 
Walsh v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 656 F.2d 367, 370 (8th Cir. 1981). 
According to a leading treatise on remedies: 
[DJeceit is an economic, not a dignitary 
tort, and resembles, in the interests it 
seeks to protect, a contract claim more than 
a tort claim. For this reason, though strong 
men may cry at the loss of money, separate 
recovery for mental anguish is usually denied 
in deceit cases, just as it is denied in 
contract cases, simply because emotional 
distress, though resulting naturally enough 
from many frauds, is not one of the interests 
the law ordinarily seeks to protect in deceit 
cases. 
D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies. § 9.2 at 602 (1973) 
(footnotes omitted); see also Pihakis v. Cottrell. 243 So.2d 685, 
692 (Ala. 1971) ("plaintiff must show . . . actual pecuniary loss 
as the result of the fraud"); Jurcich v. General Motors Corp., 
539 S.W.2d 595, 600-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) ("deceit belongs to 
that class of tort of which pecuniary loss constitutes a part of 
the cause of action"). 
Under section 525 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "One 
who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, . . . is 
subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss." 
(Emphasis added.) Furthermore, in addressing the measure of 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, section 549 of the 
Restatement states, "The recipient of a fraudulent 
QInsR7-rA Q 
misrepresentation is entitled to recover . . . the pecuniary loss 
. . . of which the misrepresentation is a legal cause, including" 
the difference between the value of what was received in the 
transaction and its purchase price and "pecuniary loss suffered 
otherwise as a consequence of . . . the misrepresentation." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549(1)(a) and (b) (1977) 
(emphasis added). While the Restatement does not specifically 
exclude emotional distress damages in a cause of action for 
fraud, the repeated references to "pecuniary loss" implicitly 
excludes such recovery. R. Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Fraud 
156 (1988). 
Inasmuch as fraud is an economic tort directed towards 
redressing pecuniary losses, Cornell, 408 N.W.2d at 382; Walsh, 
656 F.2d at 370, we conclude that the better reasoned approach is 
to disallow recovery of emotional distress damages in a fraud 
action. As a result, the trial court correctly refused to 
instruct the jury accordingly. 
EVIDENCE OF PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY AND PAST DRUG USE 
On cross appeal, Turner claims that the trial court erred by 
admitting evidence concerning her psychiatric history and past 
drug use. Whether evidence is admissible is a question of law 
reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991).9 
Turner contends that the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of her psychiatric history and past drug use because the 
evidence was irrelevant. Evidence is relevant if it has "any 
9. Decisions prior to Ramirez created some confusion as to the 
proper standard for reviewing a court's determination on 
admissibility of evidence. See, e.g.. Whitehead v. American 
Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990) ("[i]n 
reviewing questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, 
deference is given to the trial court's advantageous position; 
thus, that court's rulings regarding admissibility will not be 
overturned *unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in 
error.'") (quoting State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 
1986)); State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988) (M[i]t 
is well settled that trial court rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence are not to be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse 
of discretion"); Gray. 717 P.2d at 1316 (,f[t]his Court will not 
disturb the ruling of the trial court on questions of 
admissibility of evidence unless it clearly appears that the 
lower court was in error"). In Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3, the 
Utah Supreme Court acknowledged this confusion. 
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tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. 
Quite clearly, the evidence pertaining to Turner's psychiatric 
history and past drug use was relevant to the determination of 
whether her claimed emotional distress damages under her invasion 
of privacy claim were the result of a preexisting condition or 
were caused by defendants' conduct. 
Turner contends that even if the evidence relating to her 
psychiatric history and past drug use were relevant, the court 
erred in admitting it because the prejudicial effect of the 
evidence outweighed its probative value. Under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if "its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice." The trial court's determination that evidence is 
admissible under Rule 403 is reviewed for correctness, "[b]ut in 
deciding whether the trial court erred as a matter of law, we de 
facto grant it some discretion, because we reverse only if we 
conclude that it acted unreasonably in striking the balance." 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3. In Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile 
Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 
McFarland v. Skaaas Cos., 678 P.2d 298, 304 (Utah 1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court defined evidence that is "unfairly prejudicial" as 
evidence having 
a tendency to influence the outcome of the 
trial by improper means, or if it appeals to 
the jury's sympathies, or arouses its sense 
of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or 
otherwise causes a jury to base its decision 
on something other than the established 
propositions of the case. 
Id. at 323 n.31. 
The evidence involving Turner's psychiatric history and past 
drug use was probative of whether her claimed emotional distress 
damages were the result of a preexisting condition or were caused 
by defendants' conduct. Having reviewed the trial court's 
determination that the danger of unfair prejudice did not 
substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value, we 
conclude, in light of the discretion given to a trial court in 
performing a Rule 4 03 balancing, that the court correctly 
admitted the evidence. 
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Finally, pursuant to the tort law doctrine commonly referred 
to as the "thin-skull" or "eggshell skull" rule,10 Turner argues 
that because defendants are required to take her as they find 
her, the court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of her 
psychiatric history and past drug use. This argument fails 
because, "even though it is true that one who injures another 
takes him as he is, nevertheless the plaintiff may not recover 
damages for any pre-existing condition or disability she may have 
had which did not result from any fault of the defendant." 
Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451, 453 (1966) 
(footnote omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the trial 
court (1) erred in granting j.n.o.v., (2) correctly refused to 
instruct the jury that emotional distress damages are recoverable 
in a cause of action for fraud, and (3) correctly admitted 
evidence concerning Turner's psychiatric history and past drug 
use. Other arguments raised by the parties need not be 
considpr6cT fft view of our d^jision herein. Therefore, we reverse 
the JfudqmentJof theytria^p^urt, and remand for judgment 
consistent jfith th^jujr^s verdict. No costs are awarded. 
•Regnal W. Garff, Judg 
WE COJIP^ R: 
^rm*& 7^ f^fii. «no-Jt^ 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
10. See W. Page Keeton et al.. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts. § 43, at 292 (5th ed. 1984). 
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